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ELICITING	EXPERTS’	KNOWLEDGE	IN	
EMERGENCY	RESPONSE	
ORGANIZATIONS	
Abstract 
Purpose: Experienced fire ground commanders are known to make decisions in time-pressured and dynamic 
environments. The purpose of this paper is to report some of the tacit knowledge and skills expert firefighters use 
in performing complex fire ground tasks.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: This study utilized a structured knowledge elicitation tool, known as the critical 
decision method (CDM), to elicit expert knowledge. Seventeen experienced fire-fighters were interviewed in-
depth using a semi-structured CDM interview protocol. The CDM protocol was analyzed using the emergent 
themes analysis (ETA) approach 
Findings: Findings from the CDM protocol reveal both the salient cues sought, which we termed critical cue 
inventory (CCI), and the goals pursued by the fire ground commanders at each decision point. The CCI is 
categorized into five classes based on the type of information each cue generates to the incident commanders 
Practical Implications: Since the critical decision method is a useful tool for identifying training needs, this study 
discussed the practical implications for transferring experts’ knowledge to novice firefighters 
Originality/Value: Although many authors recognize that experts perform exceptionally well in their domains of 
practice, the difficulty still lies in getting a structured method for unmasking experts’ tacit knowledge. This paper is 
therefore relevant as it presents useful findings following a naturalistic knowledge elicitation study that was 
conducted across different fire stations in the UK and Nigeria.   
Keywords: Expert, Tacit knowledge, Decision making, critical decision method, firefighters, experience, cues, 
emergency response, training 
Article classification: Research paper  
Introduction 
During fire incidents, civilians whose lives and properties are at stake usually expect a lot from the 
incident command teams (Boin and Lagadec, 2000). In fact, members of the public usually judge the 
effectiveness of any response effort on the basis of how much lives and properties response crews 
were able to successfully save (Tissington and Flin, 2005; Ingham, 2008). Therefore considering the 
huge expectations members of the public hold for response teams, it is logical to expect that 
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managing more dangerous and un-predictable fires will call for the skills and knowledge of the more 
experienced firefighters.   
Cognitive researchers have broadly classified experts’ knowledge into two broad categories i.e. 
explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge (Ten Berge and Van Hezewijk 1999; Van Merrienboer et al., 
2002; Tulving, 2002). Explicit knowledge is the type of knowledge that is easily expressed verbally by 
professionals, and it is made up of stored facts and events which experts are able to state explicitly. 
This type of knowledge supports performance through the conceptual understanding of the 
procedures and principles surrounding job tasks in a particular domain. Experts have been shown to 
possess extensive explicit knowledge which is subsequently represented in schemas (Salas et al., 
2010), and it is this schema-based framework that enables experts to retain and recall information 
with a high degree of accuracy (Ericsson et al., 2007).  
Nonetheless, despite the importance of acquiring declarative knowledge, it has proved to be of 
limited use in the area of generating effective skilled performance or for subsequent use for training 
purposes (Klein, 1997; Clark et al., 2007; Okoli et al., 2013). This is because experts can 
unintentionally misrepresent the conceptual knowledge upon which their competence is based: a 
paradox where professionals are able to refer to scientific data, theoretical manuals and standard 
operational procedures (SOPs) in clear explicit terms, yet using the same factual knowledge tacitly 
(Eraut, 2004; Fessey, 2002; Spender, 2008; Feldon, 2007). On this note, it therefore seems that 
experts’ performance is qualified by another type of knowledge i.e. tacit knowledge (Nonaka and 
Krogh, 2009). Tacit knowledge operates outside the conscious awareness of professionals and 
basically involves a detailed understanding of how a system operates (how to do things). This 
knowledge has been regarded as a compulsory requirement for all skilled performance and is 
characterized by both situational and strategic procedural qualities such as assessing, deciding, 
acting and monitoring (Polanyi, 1962; Alavis and Leidner, 2001; Eraut, 2004).  
There has been a long standing debate in the literature over the validity of some methods that 
have previously been used to elicit experts’ knowledge e.g. laboratory experiments, simulation tasks, 
quantitative survey etc. (Doherty, 1993; Bontis, 2001; Kahneman and Klein, 2009; Dane and Pratt, 
2009).  Although these previous methods served their purposes to certain extents, sceptics still 
believe they are incapable of effectively capturing tacit knowledge (Lipshitz et al., 2001; Tsoukas, 
2003; Klein, 2008; Nonaka and Krogh, 2009). This is mainly because tacit knowledge dwells within 
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the unconscious realm, hence requiring a more structured knowledge elicitation tool in order to make 
any meaningful contribution.  
This paper therefore sets out to address three critical issues associated with the elicitation of 
expert knowledge and/or the transfer of such knowledge: (i) it assesses the importance of utilizing 
only the most qualified personnel (verified experts) when eliciting knowledge for training purposes, 
especially in high risk organizations such as the fire service (ii) it discusses one of the most effective 
strategies for eliciting expert knowledge ─ the critical decision method and (iii) it discusses the 
implications of transferring tacit knowledge from experts to novices.  
In doing so, the naturalistic decision making approach, and in particular the critical decision 
method, was employed in this study as the knowledge elicitation tool. According to Klein (2008), 
naturalistic decision making is a descriptive model which gives a detailed representation of how 
experts actually make decisions in the real world, using their experience. This contrasts the normative 
model or classical theory which suggests, in advance, how decisions should be made e.g. using 
mathematical formulas or rules (Satz and Ferejohn, 1994). 
We wish to clarify that although this study was carried out in two different countries, UK and 
Nigeria, the findings reported here represent the elicited tacit knowledge that is applicable to expert 
firefighters in both countries. The cultural and cognitive differences observed amongst the firefighters 
from both countries are beyond the scope of this current article and are therefore not reported here.       
Why do we need experts in Knowledge Elicitation? 
Many authors are generally convinced that emergency frontline responders need both a new way of 
thinking and a different approach to training — if they are to be better equipped for the challenges 
posed by the modern day crises (Boin and Lagadec 2000; Alexander 2000; Salas et al., 2010; 
Milasinovic et al., 2010). The training methodologies currently being adopted by most emergency 
organizations and the knowledge and routine skills derived from such ‘normal’ training have been 
shown to no longer be sufficient for coping with the complexity and unpredictability associated with 
present day crises (Boin and Lagadec, 2000; Ericsson et al., 2007). This also explains why the field of 
emergency and crisis management, in times like this, need more studies that will focus on 
demystifying the experiences, knowledge (especially tacit knowledge) and skills (including non-
technical skills) of experts (Flin et al., 2008)  
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But who is an expert? Two very useful definitions have been selected for the purpose of this 
study: (i) Shanteau (1992) defined experts as “those who have been recognized within their 
profession as having the necessary skills and abilities to perform at the highest level”. (ii) Kahneman 
and Klein (2009), using an analogy within the domain of fire-fighting, assert that “when colleagues 
say: if Person X had been there instead of Person Y, the fire would not have spread as far,” then 
Person X is regarded as an expert in that organization. The first definition therefore relates to 
personal competence while the second links expertise to peer nomination.  
What are the qualities that make experts outstanding in their domain of practice? 
Summarized below are some specialized techniques used by experts for solving difficult domain tasks 
and making intuitive decisions in time pressured environments: 
• Information filtering. Experts are able to systematically sift relevant information from 
irrelevant ones thereby increasing the cognitive capacity of working memory in order to 
accommodate more useful data. This technique has also been shown to drastically reduce 
the risk of cognitive overload in experts (Tulving, 2002). Experts organize their schemata such 
that they are able to ignore mental noise, which allows them pay closer attention to the more 
pressing cognitive demands (Klein, 2003) 
• Rich knowledge base and mental models. Experts have been shown to possess 
greater domain knowledge than novices (Kahneman and Klein, 2009). This is because 
experts strive to organize their knowledge using inferences and principles which, in turn, 
allows them to construct a rich mental model (Van Merrienboer et al., 2002). A Mental model 
is a cognitive representation of how things work or an internal representation of the external 
world. In addition, experts tend to understand the dynamics of events in their domain and 
know how tasks and subtasks are supposed to be performed, how equipment is supposed to 
function, and how team members are supposed to perform their tasks (Ingham, 2008).  
• Pattern matching: This is the ability of experts to address a current situation by 
recognizing patterns as similar to those previously stored in memory (Gobet 2005). This 
particular feature has elsewhere been termed recognition primed decision making (Klein, 
1997). Furthermore, experts tend to identify cues collectively (patterns), whereas novices 
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focus more on fragmented cues without having much understanding of how cues actually link 
up to form a whole.  
• Finding leverage points:  This is the ability of experts to form effective improvisation 
strategies when faced with novel (atypical) situations that require making creative decisions. 
For example, Klein (1997) reported how a fire-ground commander used a belt intended to 
secure firefighters while on a ladder to rescue a woman who was dangling on the metal 
support of a highway sign. The report showed that the commander had mentally simulated a 
series of tactics that will ensure the woman was successfully rescued and eventually 
determined that the ladder belt would do the trick better. Ericsson et al (2007) purport that 
experts are able to develop workable improvisation strategies because they spend relatively 
more time analyzing a situation than the time they spend deliberating on a course of action.  
• Mental simulation: This is the ability of experts to project the environment’s current 
status into the future. Once an option is generated, experts use mental simulation to work it 
through at a deeper level, looking for pitfalls and/or opportunities ─ a process also known as 
progressive deepening (Kahneman and Klein, 2009). Thus, the accuracy of mental simulation 
is hinged on the quality of one’s mental model. As Salas et al (2010) put it: mental simulation 
is simply “running a mental model”. 
 
Methods 
Knowledge elicitation using the critical decision method 
Some emergency services organizations such as fire-fighting heavily rely on experts’ explanations 
about the cognitive strategies they use in solving difficult problems, which are subsequently used as 
the basis for developing training instructions for junior officers (Clark et al., 2007; Hannabuss, 2000; 
Feldon, 2007; Wong, 2000). Knowledge elicitation in such domains is therefore a crucial aspect of 
organizational learning. However, designing training instructions in such knowledge intensive 
organizations can only be possible when unconscious skills have been made conscious and when 
tacit knowledge has been transformed to explicit knowledge (Hannabuss, 2000; Alavi and Leidner, 
2001; Spender, 2008; Nonaka and Von Krogh, 2009).  
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Previous studies have shown that when structured knowledge elicitation techniques are not 
used in the elicitation process, most of the freely recalled self-reports from experts are often 
incomplete, inaccurate or error-prone (Eraut, 2004; Cooke and Breedin, 1994). Furthermore, the need 
for a structured knowledge elicitation method stems from the fact that experts are not fully aware of 
about 70% of their own decisions and mental analysis of tasks and so are unable to fully account for 
their judgments in retrospect (Clark et al., 2007). This obviously has serious implications for 
knowledge management since expert knowledge is undoubtedly required in supporting the design of 
a training curriculum.  
In this regard, the critical decision method has proved effective in enhancing the process of 
knowledge elicitation across a wide range of domains (see Hoffman et al., 1998 for a review). Klein et 
al (1989) described the critical decision method as a retrospective interview strategy that applies a set 
of cognitive probes to actual non-routine incidents that required expert judgment or decision making. 
CDM is designed to focus on the cognitive strategies that aided the successful management of past 
incidents, which is then used to articulate the training needs for managing future incidents. 
Participants 
The sample size for this study is comprised of seventeen experienced fire-fighters (n=17) and was 
selected across different major fire stations in the UK and Nigeria. Since it was important to ensure 
that the participants’ level of experience was verified and not assumed, participants were carefully 
selected on the basis of their rank/position and also through peer nomination (Shanteau, 1992). All 
the participants interviewed in this study had personally been involved in managing real-life fire 
incidents, which implies making a series of decisions independently. Also, the interviewed participants 
had at least operated as incident or operational commander (i.e. managing crews and leading one or 
more fire engines). Participants who had neither received incident command training nor managed a 
complex high-risk fire incident were therefore excluded from participating in the study. Overall, the 
mean year of experience for all the seventeen participants was 17.56 
Procedure 
Participants were first asked to recall and ‘walk-through’ a remarkable as well as a memorable major 
fire incident, which particularly challenged their expertise. They were advised in advance, either 
through email or phone call on the nature of the interview, and were also advised on the type of 
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incidents that was of interest to the researcher i.e. non-routine incidents. The reason for focusing on 
non-routine incidents is because experts tend to use their tacit knowledge mostly when solving 
difficult tasks than they do when performing routine tasks (Polanyi, 1962).  
After narrating the incident from start to finish (see Figure 1), participants were asked to go over 
the incident a second time, this time with the intention of constructing a timeline (i.e. summarizing key 
decisions that were made from the start of the incident to when the incident was brought under 
control). During the timeline construction, decision points were identified (see Figure 1). A decision 
point is the basic unit of analysis in this study and is defined as the point where a specific course of 
action was chosen from several other potentially available alternatives. Examples of decision points 
reported by experts include: ‘I committed my crews with breathing apparatus into the building’, ‘I 
withdrew my crews from the building because it was too risky’, ‘I requested more appliances because 
I thought we didn’t have enough at that moment’. The timeline construction and decision point 
identification phases were then followed by applying a set of cognitive probes so as to better elicit the 
basis of experts’ decision making strategies. The CDM cognitive probes contain a series of semi-
structured interview questions such as the rules being followed, knowledge being used and how, 
training utilized, cues sought, goals pursued at each decision point etc. (see Klein et al., 1989; 
Hoffman et al., 1998 for details on the CDM procedure).  
Each interview lasted between 1hr-2hr and was tape recorded with the consent of each 
participant, and a total of 70 decision points were obtained from the seventeen interviews.  The 
interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed using a combination of qualitative coding process 
and emergent themes analytical method that was developed by Wong (2004). 
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Figure 1: A visual description of the phases involved in the CDM procedure, Adapted from 
Klein et al., 1989   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INCIDENT 
 
Start time         INCIDENT TIMELINE                   End time 
                IDENTIFICATION OF DECISION POINTS 
                   APPLICATION OF COGNITIVE PROBES 
                   HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO 
A SUMMARY OF THE CDM PROCEDURE 
Decision Point 1 
Cues sought 
Knowledge used 
Goals pursued 
Actions taken 
Decision Point 2 
Cues sought 
Knowledge used 
Goals pursued 
Actions taken 
Decision Point 3 
Cues sought 
Knowledge used 
Goals pursued 
Actions taken 
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Results, findings and Discussion 
Due to space constraints, we discuss only two components of experts’ tacit knowledge from the CDM 
protocol: (i) The cues experts seek at each decision point and (ii) the goals they pursue at each 
decision point.    
Cues 
This study identifies the importance of cues and explains the roles different cues play in enhancing 
decision making on the fire ground. Wong (2004) defined a cue as “any stimuli with implications for 
action”, and this definition has been adopted in this study. Cues therefore include smoke colour, fire 
intensity, nature of substances present in buildings etc. 
 It is worthy of note that the cues present in an environment must be able to generate useful 
information to the decision maker, who then interprets, processes and translates the derived 
knowledge into a workable course of action. In other words, attaining effective performance might be 
hugely jeopardized if essential cues are not recognized by the actor in a timely manner. In this study, 
we identified 34 different cues across the seventeen incidents. These cues were then further 
categorized into five classes depending on the specific type of information they convey to the incident 
commanders (Table 1). For example, safety cues are cues that suggest the most appropriate safety 
boundaries for the crews and the members of public. These safety cues guide subsequent safety 
actions and also determine if some level of risks could still be accepted or if it is safer to be more 
precautionary. Environmental based cues (e.g. wind movement or atmospheric temperature) on the 
other hand refer to the climatic cues that are external to the incident, which allows commanders to 
make sense of how task performance could be affected.       
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Table 1: list of cues that aids experts’ decision making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Critical Cue Inventory (CCI) 
1. Safety related Cues 
• Cracked wall 
• Collapsed wall 
• Roof stability 
• Nature of burning contents or class of fire involved (e.g. metal fire, gas fire, batteries, acetylene) 
• Substances likely to be present in the building (e.g. petrol or other combustible materials, cylinders) 
• Potential for spread of fire 
• The behaviour of smoke in the building (potential for a flashover or backdraft) 
2. Cues that indicates the “Nature of Problem” 
• Size of Fire 
• Intensity of fire blaze 
• Movement pattern of the flame 
• Egress of flames (through the windows, attics, doors)  
• Colour of smoke (yellowish rainbow, blue, thick black) 
• Smell/odour of smoke and burning substances 
• Texture of smoke (thick, light, cloudy) 
• Proximity of the fire to other buildings 
• The severity of physical damages caused 
• The extent of injury to victims  
• Room temperature 
• The class of fire involved (class A-F)  
3. Environmental-based Cues 
• Wind direction 
• Wind velocity/intensity 
• External temperature (Hot, warm, harmattan, cold) 
• Catchment area (Residential, Factory, Industrial, Rural, City centre) 
• Location of incident (Rural or Urban area) 
4. Affective and Behavioural cues (cues that are derived from people’s emotional reaction to the 
incident) 
• Verbal threats from victims (abusive words, arson) 
• The number of crowds shouting “help” 
• The level of panic observed in the crowd 
• The intensity of cry and wailings from trapped victims 
• The numbers of passers-by/crowd gathered at the scene of the incident 
5. Search and Rescue (cues that influence officers’ risk taking behavior to rescue victims or save 
properties)  
• The location of unaffected properties  
• The location of the seat of fire 
• The type of building involved (terraced, block of flats, single-story, multi-storied) 
• The position of the entry points (easily accessible or obstructive) 
• The category of victims trapped (elderly, disabled, mentally challenged) 
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The above findings show that it is not just enough to identify cues on the fire ground; experts 
must also be able to make sense of those cues, interpret their meaning and determine how such cues 
are likely to affect task performance. For example, it is almost useless for incident commanders to 
spot a cracked wall or a collapsed roof if they are, in turn, not able to infer the implications of such 
cues and act accordingly.  
These findings seem to contradict the early work of Easterbrook (1959). Easterbrook’s cue-
utilization theory suggests that consistently arousing the emotions of decision makers through some 
external stimuli will result in the reduction in the number of cues that will eventually be generated and 
utilized by the decision maker. The theory also suggests that such reduction in the number of 
generated cues usually have negative impacts on task performance. This current study however 
found little or no evidence to support Easterbrook’s theory. The expert firefighters were not found to 
be distracted away from identifying other cues, even for incidents where victims and passers-by were 
reportedly being very emotional (crying, shouting, wailing etc.). As a result, this study is seen to favour 
the position of other scholars who believe that generating more or less cues does not necessarily 
result to a better performance (Tissington and Flin, 2005; Perry and Wiggins, 2008). According to 
these scholars, what matters most is that the decision maker is able to understand the most relevant 
cues needed to generate action plans (IF-THEN, WHEN-THEN relationships), including an 
understanding of the implications of the identified cues 
Findings from Table 1 also show that experts are able to easily discriminate between cues, and 
this seems to be possible because of their well refined perceptual skills developed over many years of 
consistent practice (Gobet, 2005; Ericsson et al., 2007). Cue discrimination relates to one’s ability to 
identify subtle differences and/or similarities across various informational cues. For example, experts 
are expected to have an understanding of the various classes of fire that exist and be able to 
discriminate between them. These include using visible cues such as smoke colour/ texture, and 
perceptual cues such as smell/odour as discriminatory variables. This is why cue discrimination has 
also been regarded as one of the hallmarks of expertise (Gobet, 2005; Perry and Wiggins, 2008).  For 
example, in an empirical study aimed at identifying the rules used by experts to differentiate roof 
“squishiness”, Calderwood et al. (1987) surprisingly discovered that no visible rule exists for such a 
decision. One of the experienced fire-fighters interviewed by the authors explained that “you simply 
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have to stand on a number of squishy roofs and on a number of un-squishy roofs until you are able to 
know the difference between them. Unfortunately, to most novices all roofs are squishy”. 
Goals pursued 
 
One of the benefits of using the critical decision method for knowledge elicitation is that it is designed, 
inter alia, to capture the main goals and sub-goals pursued by experts at each decision point. True 
experts are goal-oriented individuals who have specific goals and expectations in mind. Analysis of 
the CDM data showed that all the experts were pursuing at least one goal at each decision point 
(Table 2). 
In the CDM protocol, participants were asked to explain the goals they were pursuing at each 
decision point, after which the goals were carefully matched against the incident account for 
verification (Figure 1). Also, since the incident commanders will normally pursue different goals 
depending on the circumstances surrounding their respective incidents, they were further asked to 
explain the rationale behind the goals and sub-goals they were pursuing at each decision point. The 
goals pursued by expert commanders were analyzed across all the incidents and then sub-
categorized as shown in Table 2: 
Table2: Analysis of Goals pursued by experts and the number of decision points associated 
with each goal. 
Goals pursued No of Decision points 
Safety of crew and public members 19 
Resource reinforcement and support  8 
Timely completion of task 7 
Crew-task management 5 
Ventilation of building 2 
Prevention 15 
Rescue & Salvage 4 
Extinguishing the fire 13 
Evacuation 3 
Gaining access to the scene of the fire 8 
Professionalism & Ethics of work (PEW) 10 
 
Table 2 shows that the main goal for all response operations on the fire ground is not 
necessarily to extinguish the fire, rather response goals seem to vary depending on certain factors 
such as the nature of the incident, the environment where the incident occurred, the make-up of the 
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response team as well as the intensity and size of the fire. Therefore, the popular assumption that fire 
commanders mainly pursue the goal of “extinguishing the fire” tends to oversimplify the complexity of 
fire ground tasks in real life. For instance, in high-risk incidents such as incidents involving highly 
combustible substances in buildings with access difficulties, incident commanders were found to be 
more concerned with ensuring the safety of both the crew and those of the members of public. In such 
situations, their main goal seemed to be safety related (DP=19), but at the same time doing their best 
to extinguish the fire with the resources available at their disposal. Conversely, in incidents where the 
fire is well-alight and rapidly blazing, incident commanders tended to aim at either damage 
limitation/containment, in which case they focus on “boxing” the fire, or prevention, in which case they 
attempt to avert the fire from spreading to other surrounding buildings or properties.  
The above insights are therefore consistent with existing claims that the ability to manage 
shifting goals under time pressure is one of the hallmarks of expertise (Shanteau, 1992; Klein, 1997; 
Wong, 2000). A direct relationship exists between the cues identified by experts, the goals they 
pursue and the subsequent actions they take. In other words, as soon as experts identify certain 
cues, they use their experience and wide domain knowledge to interpret the implications of such cues 
and then prioritize response goals. This implies that goals are rarely set from the start of the incident 
since the goal(s) pursued at any given time is dependent on the ever changing conditions of the 
incident. But once the fire ground commanders eventually set their goals and sub-goals, they are then 
ready to channel their resources towards the attainment of such goals, however with some degree of 
flexibility in order to accommodate potential changes.  
The above findings give credence to the descriptive decision making theory proposed by 
Beach (1978, 1993), known as the image theory. The theory postulates that decision makers usually 
represent information in the form of four images:  a set of values and beliefs, the specific goals to 
which the decision maker is striving, the defined operational plans for reaching the goals, and the 
anticipated results of the plans. Beach (1993) advised that for tasks to be carried out effectively, these 
four images must be well harnessed by the decision maker such that conflicts are avoided between 
and within the four images. The author puts it this way: “Each plan is an abstract sequence of 
potential activities beginning with goal adoption and ending with goal attainment”. This implies that no 
action plan is developed independent of the goal it aims to achieve. 
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Conclusion 
With the emergence of expert systems and growing interest in naturalistic/real world decision making, 
researchers have become interested in the content knowledge of experts (Shanteau, 1992; Hoffman 
et al., 1998). As shown from earlier discussions, one of the most effective ways of improving the 
overall level of human performance in a particular task is to understand how proficient individuals 
actually perform such task in real life (Okoli et al., 2013). The principle behind this approach is that by 
carrying out a detailed study on the general knowledge, specific information, and reasoning processes 
used by experts, a “model” which exhibits some of the properties of the expert can be developed.  
However, eliciting expert knowledge is not enough if such knowledge is not intended to be 
effectively utilized for training purposes. In other words, one of the very important conditions for 
developing the cognitive skills of less experienced personnel is by providing them with adequate 
opportunities to learn the relevant cues used by the most qualified domain experts (Ericcson et al., 
2007). This supports Winterton et al.’s (2005) definition of knowledge as the interaction between 
intelligence (capacity to learn) and situation (opportunity to learn). Thus, without an opportunity to 
learn and practice, people will be unable to update their knowledge banks.  
Facilitators and instructional design theorists must therefore be able to meet the challenges of 
designing and implementing well-structured programs that will aim to provide learners with a focused, 
yet extensive index of experiential (tacit) knowledge over a given period of time (Klein, 2003). 
Through such training and the lessons learnt from it, the schemata (action scripts, repertoires and 
mental models) of less experienced personnel can then be developed until they are able acquire the 
skills required for performing non-recurrent tasks (Van Merrienboer et al., 2002; Feldon, 2007; 
Ericsson et al., 2007).  
Hence, in terms of knowledge transfer, we strongly recommend the concept of learning through 
practice as a useful means for teaching novices most of experts’ skills. We suggest that junior 
officers, in addition to the theoretical lessons they are made to learn, should also be allowed to have 
real-life practical experiences by attending real fires under the tutelage of the more experienced 
officers. There is substantial evidence to demonstrate that experiences gained in real-life (on-the-job) 
practice settings have the potential of making more important contributions that cannot be afforded by 
experiences in other settings (c/f Klein, 2003). Learning should therefore be seen as an ongoing 
activity for less-experienced personnel as well as a crucial part of their daily thinking and acting 
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(Fessey, 2002). This way, novices are made to learn the most current, tailored and up-to-date skills 
based on the constantly changing environment typical of most high risk organizations. In sum, novice 
firefighters can learn from more superior officers by consciously learning and practicing what the 
superior officers do. Observing and practicing what others does can be a fast way of understanding 
how various components of a complex task fit together to form a whole task. What learners see 
continuously over a period of time automatically creates a mental “picture” which is then structured in 
their memory and ready to be recalled when similar challenges are encountered in the future.  
Finally, although we acknowledge the decreasing rate of major fire incidents, particularly in the 
UK, implying that novices might not have as many windows of opportunity of gaining real-life 
experience(s) as would normally be expected, we still believe, nonetheless, that the outputs 
presented in this article (the critical cue inventory and goal decomposition) could play a significant role 
in enhancing the learning of complex skills through the design of training and simulation exercises. 
For example, training facilitators can construct a wide range of learning tasks from the elicited expert 
knowledge, with the hope of making existing training curricula more realistic and more representative 
of real-life incidents. This will also ensure that the intuitive skills required for managing real life 
incidents in dynamic and time-pressured conditions are made available to novices especially when 
they do not have the immediate opportunity of gaining such experience(s) in real-life.  
Further studies are therefore needed in the area of structuring training curricula that will both be 
effective and at the same time considerate for the less experienced firefighters. By being considerate 
we mean a learning framework that will strive to attain a balance between the cognitive load within the 
learning materials (intrinsic cognitive load) and the cognitive capacity of the learners.  
 
References 
Alavi, M. and Leidner, D. E. (2001), “Review: Knowledge Management and Knowledge Management 
Systems: Conceptual Foundations and Research Issues”, MIS Quarterly, Vol 25 No.1, pp. 
107-136. 
Alexander, D. (2000), “Scenario methodology for teaching principles of emergency management”, 
Journal of Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 89-97.  
Boin R. A. and Lagadec P. (2000), “Preparing for the Future: Critical Challenges in Crisis 
Management”, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 185–191. 
Bontis, N. (2001) “Assessing knowledge assets: a review of the models used to measure intellectual 
capital”, International Journal of Management Reviews, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 41-60. 
Calderwood, R., Crandall B. and Klein G.A. (1987), “Expert and novice fire ground command 
decisions” (KATR-858(D)-87-02F). In Final Report under contract MDA903-85-C-0327 for the 
U.S. Army Research Institute Alexandria, VA Fairborn OH, Klein Associates. 
Page 15 of 17 International Journal of Emergency Services
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
16 
 
Clark, R. E., Feldon, D., van Merrienboer, J., Yates, K. and Early, S.  (2007), Cognitive Task Analysis, 
in Spector, J. M., Merrill, M. D., van Merriënboer, J. J. G. and Driscoll, M. P. (eds.) Handbook 
of research on educational communications and technology, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Marwah NJ. 
Cooke N. J. and Breedin S.D. (1994), “Constructing naive theories of motion on-the-fly”, Memory and 
Cognition, Vol. 22, pp. 474-493. 
Dane, E. and Pratt, M.E. (2009), “Conceptualizing and measuring intuition: a review of recent trends”, 
International Review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Vol. 24, pp. 1-40 
Doherty, M. E. (1993), “A Laboratory Scientist’s View of Naturalistic Decision Making”, in G. Klein, J. 
Orasanu, R. Calderwood and C. Zsambok (eds) Decision Making in Action pp, Ablex, 
Norwood CT, pp.362-388 
Easterbrook, J. A. (1959), “The effect of emotion on cue utilization and the organization of behavior”, 
Psychological review, Vol. 66 No. 3, pp. 183-201 
Eraut, M. (2004), “Informal learning in the workplace”, Studies in Continuing Education, Vol. 26 No 2, 
pp. 247-273 
Ericsson, K. A., Prietula, M. J. and Cokely, E. T. (2007), “The making of an expert”, Harvard Business 
Review, Vol. 85, pp. 114–121 
Feldon, D.F. (2007), “The Implications of Research on Expertise for Curriculum and Pedagogy”, 
Journal of Education Psychology Review, Vol. 19, pp. 91-110 
Fessey, C.A. (2002), “Capturing expertise in the development of practice: Methodology and 
approaches”, Learning in Health and Social Care, Vol. 1 No.1, pp. 47-58. 
Flin, R., O’connor, P. and Crichton, M. (2008), Safety at the sharp end: a guide to non-technical skills, 
Ashgate, UK 
Gobet, F. (2005), “Chunking models of expertise: Implications for education”, Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, Vol. 19 No.2, pp.183-204. 
Hannabuss, S. (2000), “Narrative Knowledge: eliciting organizational knowledge from storytelling”, 
Aslib proceedings, Vol. 52 No.10, pp. 402-413  
Hoffman, R.R., Crandall, B. and Shadbolt, N.R. (1998), “Use of the Critical Decision Method to elicit 
expert knowledge: A case study in the Methodology of Cognitive Task Analysis”, Journal of 
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, Vol. 40 No.2, pp. 254-276  
Ingham, V. (2008), “Crisis communication and multimodal decision making on the fireground”, 
Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 9-13 
Kahneman, D. and Klein, G. (2009), “Conditions for Intuitive Expertise; A failure to Disagree”, Journal 
of the American Psychological Association Vol. 64, No. 6, pp. 515-526 
Klein, G. A., Calderwood, R. and MacGregor, D. (1989), “Critical decision method for eliciting 
knowledge”, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Vol. 19, pp. 462-472. 
Klein, G. (1997), “Developing expertise in decision-making”, Thinking and Reasoning, Vol. 3, pp. 337-
352. 
Klein, G. (2003), The power of Intuition: How to use your gut feelings to make better decisions at 
Work, Doubleday, New York. 
Klein, G. (2008), “Naturalistic decision making”, The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Society, Vol. 50 No. 3, pp. 456-460. 
Lipshitz, R., Klein, G., Orasanu, J. and Salas, E. (2001), “Focus article: Taking stock of Naturalistic 
Decision Making”, Journal of Behavioural Decision Making, Vol. 14, pp. 331-352  
Milasinovic S, Kesetovic Z. and Nadic, D. (2010), “The power and impotence of crisis management in 
facing modern crises”, Scientific review paper, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 273-290 
Nonaka, I. and Von Krogh, G. (2009), “Perspective—Tacit knowledge and knowledge conversion: 
Controversy and advancement in organizational knowledge creation theory”, Organization 
science, Vol. 20 No. 3, pp. 635-652. 
Okoli, J.O., Weller, G., Watt, J. and Wong, B.L.W. (2013), Decision making strategies used by experts 
and the potential for training intuitive skills: A preliminary study, in Proceedings of the 11
th
 
International Conference on Naturalistic Decision Making, May 22-24, Arpege Science 
Publishing, Marseille. 
Polanyi, M. (1962), “Tacit knowing: Its bearing on some problems of Philosophy”, Reviews of Modern 
Physics, Vol. 34 No. 4, pp. 601-615. 
Salas, E., Rosen, M. A. and DiazGranados, D. (2010), “Expertise-based intuition and decision making 
in organizations”, Journal of Management, Vol. 36 No. 4, pp. 941–973. 
Satz, D. and Ferejohn, J. (1994), “Rational choice and social theory”, The Journal of philosophy, Vol. 
91 No. 2, pp. 71-87. 
Page 16 of 17International Journal of Emergency Services
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
17 
 
Shanteau, J. (1992), “Competence in experts: the role of task characteristics”, Organisational 
Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 53, pp. 252-266. 
Spender, J.C. (2008), “Organizational learning and knowledge management: Whence and whither?”, 
Management Learning, Vol.39 No. 2, pp. 159–176. 
Ten Berge, T. and Van Hezewijk, R. (1999), “Procedural and Declarative Knowledge: An Evolutionary 
Perspective”, Theory and Psychology, Vol. 9 No. 5, pp. 605–24. 
Tissington, P. and Flin, R. (2005), “Assessing risk in dynamic situations: lessons from fire service 
operations”, Risk Management, Vol. 7 No. 4, pp. 43-51. 
Tsoukas, H. (2003), “Do we really understand tacit knowledge?”, in M. Easterby-Smith, M. Lyles 
(eds), The Blackwell Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge Management, 
Blackwell, Oxford, UK, pp. 410–427. 
Tulving, E. (2002), “Episodic memory: From mind to brain”, Annual Review Psychology Vol. 53, pp. 1–
25 
Van Merriënboer, J.J.G., Clark, R.E. and de Croock, M.B.M (2002), “Blueprints for complex learning: 
the 4C/ID model”, Educational. Technology Research Development, Vol. 50 No. 2, pp. 39–
64. 
Winterton, J., Delamare-LeDeist, F. and Stringfellow, E. (2005), Typology of knowledge, skills and 
competences: clarification of the concept and prototype. Centre for European Research on 
Employment and Human Resources, Final Draft Report. 
Wong, B.L.W. (2000), “The Integrated Decision Model in Emergency Dispatch Management and its 
implications for Design”, Australian Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 2 No. 7, pp. 95-107. 
Wong, B. L. W. (2004), Data analysis for the Critical Decision Method, in D. Diaper & N. Stanton 
(eds.), Task Analysis for Human-Computer Interaction, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Mahwah NJ, pp. 327-346. 
Page 17 of 17 International Journal of Emergency Services
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
